## 1NC

### 1

**Text: The United States federal government should pass Senate bill 182.**

Solves the aff – only difference is Dodd Frank

Addison 10/15 [Velda Addison is Associate Editor (E&P) at Hart Energy “Senate Approves US-Mexico Transboundary Deal” October 15, 2013 <http://www.epmag.com/Technology-Regulations/Senate-Approves-US-Mexico-Transboundary-Deal_124221> accessed on October 21, 2013] JAKE LEE

The transboundary agreement that would allow Mexico and the US to jointly explore and produce hydrocarbons in the western part of the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) has won Senate approval. The action is a step toward opening nearly 1.5 million acres that are currently under moratorium, removing legal uncertainty caused by maritime border issues. Senators approved the bill Saturday, without amendment and by unanimous consent, as the government shutdown loomed. The move came more than a year after government officials from both countries signed the agreement and Mexico ratified the deal. The legislation authorizes the secretary of the interior to implement the terms of the agreement. These include approving unitization agreements and related arrangements for the exploration, development, or production of oil or gas from transboundary reservoirs and geological structures; disclosing necessary E&P information concerning the transboundary reservoir or geological structure that may be considered confidential, privileged, or proprietary information; and “accepting and taking action not inconsistent with an expert determination under the agreement.” The House passed its version of the bill in June. A key difference between the two is the House version exempts oil and gas companies from a Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act provision requiring them to disclose payments made to a foreign government. “The agreement signed by the Obama Administration and Mexico specifically provides what royalty payments Mexico would receive from energy developers,” according to the legislative digest for the bill. “However, under [Dodd-Frank], companies that commercially develop oil, natural gas, or minerals are required to disclose payments made to a foreign government. This could create a potential conflict because Mexico has yet to decide how [it] will collect royalties and could potentially set regulatory measures that prohibit disclosure of payments.”

### 2

#### Immigration reform will pass—momentum

Sargent 10/30 – Greg Sargent is an opinions writer for the WaPo. He joined the Post in early 2009, after stints at Talking Points Memo, New York Magazine and the New York Observer. (“Immigration reform is definitely undead”, 10/30/2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/30/immigration-reform-is-definitely-undead/)

We now have three House Republicans who have signed on to the House Dem comprehensive immigration reform bill, **putting immigration reform officially back in the “undead” category**. GOP Rep. David Valadao of California is officially on board with the bipartisan proposal, according to a statement from the Congressman sent my way: “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year. “By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.” Valadao’s move is not wholly unexpected, given that he inhabits a moderate district with a lot of Latinos. But his insistence that addressing immigration reform “cannot wait” is helpful. It seems like an implicit message to the GOP leadership: We must act this year, and on this bill, if necessary. This comes after GOP Reps. leana Ros-Lehtinen and Jeff Denham Jeff Denham did the same. Denham has said he expects “more” Republicans to ultimately sign on, and has also said that the House GOP leadership told him there will be a vote on something immigration-related by the end of the year. It’s unclear whether there will actually be a House vote on anything involving immigration before the year runs out, and it seems very unlikely that there will be a vote on the House Dem measure, which is essentially the Senate comprehensive immigration reform bill, without the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment that House Dems dislike, and instead with another border security amendment House Dems like swapped in. However, the movement among Republicans towards the Dem bill — even if it is only a trickle for now — is interesting, as a reminder that immigration reform can happen if House GOP leaders actually want it to.

#### lobbies are pushing the senate bill – passing the Dodd Frank would only kick up more dust

Geman 10/21 - Ben a environment reporter for the hill(“Oil industry backs US-Mexico drilling bill without Dodd-Frank waiver”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/329641-oil-industry-backs-us-mexico-drilling-bill-without-dodd-frank-waiver->, 10/21/13)NM

An influential oil industry group is no longer pressing the House to include waivers from part of the Dodd-Frank law in legislation to implement a 2012 U.S.-Mexico offshore drilling accord. The American Petroleum Institute’s stance could help win enactment of the Senate version of the bill to implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which recently passed without opposition and does not provide a Dodd-Frank exemption. “We are urging the transboundary agreement to get passed by both sides. I think the cleanest way you would see that occur is through a bill that doesn’t have the . . . [waiver] attached to it,” API’s Erik Milito told reporters Monday, adding it would “make sense” for the House to accept the Senate plan. Milito allowed that while there may be space for House-Senate discussion, “At this point I think it is just important to get that agreement passed by both sides and get it to the president’s desk.” The House-approved implementing bill gives companies operating under the U.S.-Mexico pact waivers from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments. The oil-and-gas industry strongly opposes the mandate and has previously supported the House bill. But API has already hinted that it’s fine letting go of the Dodd-Frank provision in the House bill, and the comments by Milito signal that industry's interest in seeing the deal implemented trumps the effort to secure the Dodd-Frank waiver. In addition, the political landscape has changed significantly since the House passed its version of the bill in June. The Securities and Exchange Commission is rewriting the Dodd-Frank regulation after a court struck down an earlier version, and the SEC’s chairwoman recently hinted that she will be open to crafting a less prescriptive rule. Milito, who is director of upstream and industry operations for API, said he is “pretty optimistic” about getting the bill across the finish line. The U.S.-Mexico drilling pact – which backers say would provide legal certainty needed to enable development along a shared Gulf of Mexico boundary – has bipartisan support.

#### They’re key to the agenda

**Froomkin ’11** [4/6/11, Dan Froomkin is contributing editor of Nieman Reports, and the former senior Washington correspondent for the Huffington Post, “How The Oil Lobby Greases Washington's Wheels”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases\_n\_845720.html]

**Clout in Washington isn't about winning legislative battles -- it's about making sure that they never happen at all. The oil and gas industry has that kind of clout**. Despite astronomical profits during what have been lean years for most everyone else, **the oil and gas industry continues to benefit from massive, multi-billion dollar taxpayer subsidie**s. **Opinion polling shows the American public overwhelmingly wants those subsidies eliminated**. Meanwhile, both parties are hunting feverishly for ways to reduce the deficit. But **when President Obama called on Congress to eliminate about $4 billion a year in tax breaks for Big Oil earlier this year, the response on the Hill was little more than a knowing chuckle**. Even Obama's closest congressional allies don't think the president’s proposal has a shot. "I would be surprised if it got a great deal of traction," Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), chairman of the Senate energy committee, told reporters at the National Press Club a few days after Obama first announced his plan. Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.), co-author of a House bill that closely resembles **Obama's proposal, nevertheless acknowledges that it has slim chances of passing. "It will be a challenge to get anything through the House that includes any tax increase for anyone under any circumstance**," he told The Huffington Post. The list goes on: "It's **not on my radar," said Frank Maisano, a spokesman for** [**Bracewell Giuliani**](http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/firmsum.php?lname=Bracewell+%26+Giuliani&year=2010)**, a lobbying firm with several oil and gas industry clients**. **"It's old news and it's never going to happen in this Congress.** It couldn't even happen in the last Congress." **Indeed, the oil and gas industry's stranglehold on Congres is so firm that even when the Democrats controlled both houses, repeal of the subsidies didn't stand a chance**. Obama proposed cutting them in his previous two budgets as well, but the Senate -- where Republicans and consistently pro-oil Louisiana Democrat Mary Landrieu had more than enough votes to block any legislation -- never even took a stab at it. **Now that the House is controlled by the GOP, Obama's proposal is deader than an oil-soaked pelican. Over the last decade in particular, the Republican Party's anti-tax policies and pro-drilling campaign rhetoric have become nearly indistinguishable from those of Big Oil**. "Obama's been proposing to get rid of these subsidies since his first budget in February 2009," said Tyson Slocum, director of the energy program for the consumer watchdog group Public Citizen. "**The obstacle has been the petroleum industry. The American Petroleum Institute has dug in their heels and is fighting tooth and nail to retain these subsidies**." **The American Petroleum Institute (API) is the industry's enormously powerful lobbying and trade association. "API is very focused on making sure that we have a voice in policy debates**," said Martin Durbin, the organization's executive vice president for government affairs. "Certainly I hope we're having some role in the debate here."

#### Visas are key to cybersecurity preparedness

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### Cyber-vulnerability causes great power nuclear war

Fritz 9 Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament [Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, <http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf>]

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

### 3

**The aff’s framing of energy policy as a question of impacts to avoid obscures the affirmative question of what kind of society we want to build—they cement the hegemony of technological thought and undermine democratic decision making**

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

In recent times the idea of recognizing limits upon the growth of certain technologies has experienced something of a revival. Many people are prepared to entertain the notion of limiting a given technology if:

1. Its application threatens public health or safety

2. Its use threatens to exhaust some vital resource

3. It degrades the quality of the environment (air, land, and

water)

4. It threatens natural species and wilderness areas that ought

to be preserved

5. Its application causes social stresses and strains of an exaggerated

kind.

Along with ongoing discussions about ways to sustain economic growth, national competitiveness, and prosperity, these are the only matters of technology assessment that the general public, decision makers, and academicians are prepared to take seriously.

While such concerns are valid, they severely restrict the range of moral and political criteria that are permissible in public deliberations about technological change. Several years ago I tried to register my discomfort on this score with some colleagues in computer science and sociology who were doing a study of the then-novel systems ofelectronic funds transfer (EFT). They had concluded that such systems contained the potential for redistributing financial power in the world of banking. Electronic money would make possible a shift ofpower from smaller banks to large national and international financial institutions. Beyond that it appeared such systems posed serious problems about data protection and individual privacy. They asked me to suggest an effective way of presenting the possible dangers of this development to their audience of scholars and policy makers. I recommended that their research try to show that under conditions of heavy, continued exposure, EFT causes cancer in laboratory animals. Surely, that finding would be cause for concern. My ironic suggestion acknowledged what I take to be the central characteristic of socially acceptable criticism of technology in our time. Unless one can demonstrate conclusively that a particular technical practice will generate some physically evident catastrophe cancer, birth defects, destruction of the ozone layer, or some other-one might as well remain silent.

The conversation about technology and society has continued to a point at which an obvious question needs to be addressed: Are there no shared ends that matter to us any longer other than the desire to be affluent while avoiding the risk of cancer? It may be that the answer is no. The prevailing consensus seems to be that people love a life ofhigh consumption, tremble at the thought that it might end, and are displeased about having to clean up the messes that modern technologies sometimes bring. To argue a moral position convincingly these days requires that one speak to (and not depart from) people's love of material well-being, their fascination with efficiency, or their fear of death. The moral sentiments that hold force can be arrayed on a spectrum ranging from Adam Smith to Frederick W. Taylor to Thomas Hobbes. I do not wish to deny the validity of these sentiments, only to point out that they represent an extremely narrow mindset. Concerns about particular technological hazards are sometimes the beginning of a much broader political awareness. But for the most part we continue to disregard a problem that has been brewing since the earliest days of the industrial revolution-whether our society can establish forms and limits for technological change, forms and limits that derive from a positively articulated idea of what society ought to be.

As a way of beginning that project, I would suggest a simple heuristic exercise. Let us suppose that every political philosophy in a given time implies a technology or set of technologies in a particular pattern for its realization. And let us recognize that every technology of significance to us implies a set of political commitments that can be identified if one looks carefully enough. What appear to be merely instrumental choices are better seen as choices about the form of social and political life a society builds, choices about the kinds of people we want to become. Plato's metaphor, especially his reference to the shipwright, is one that an age of high technology ought to ponder carefully: we ought to layout the keels of our vessels with due consideration to what means or manner of life best serves our purpose in our voyage over the sea of time. The vessels that matter now are such things as communications systems, transit systems, energy supply and distribution systems, information networks, household instruments, biomedical technologies, and of course systems of industrial and agricultural production. Just as Plato and Aristotle posed the question, What is the best form of political society? so also an age of high technology ought to ask, What forms of technology are compatible with the kind of society we want to build?

Answers to that question often appear as subliminal themes or concealed agendas in policy discussions that seem to be about productivity, efficiency, and economic growth. A perfect set of examples can be found among the dozens of sophisticated energy studies conducted during the 1970s in response to what was then called "the energy crisis." A careful reader can survey the various reports and interpret the political and social structures their analyses and recommendations imply. 14 Would it be nuclear power administered by a benign priesthood of scientists? Would it be coal and oil brought to you by large, multinational corporations? Would it be synthetic fuels subsidized and administered by the state? Or would it be the soft energy path brought to you by you and your neighbors?

Whatever one's position might be, the prevailing consensus required that all parties base their arguments on a familiar premise: efficiency. Regardless of how a particular energy solution would affect the distribution of wealth and social power, the case for or against it had to be stated as a practical necessity deriving from demonstrable conditions of technical or economic efficiency. As the Ford Foundation's Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group explained: "When analyzing energy, one must first decide whether ordinary rules of economics can be applied." The group decided that, yes, energy should be considered "an economic variable, rather than something requiring special analysis." 15 After that decision had been made, of course, the rest was simply a matter of putting Btus or kilowatt-hours in the numerator and dollars in the denominator and worshipping the resulting ratio as gospel.

Even those who held unorthodox viewpoints in this debate found it necessary to uphold the supreme importance ofthis criterion. Thus, Amory B. Lovins, a leading proponent ofsoft energy paths, wrote of his method: "While not under the illusion that facts are separable from values, I have tried ... to separate my personal preferences from my analytic assumptions and to rely not on modes of discourse that might be viewed as overtly ideological, but rather on classicial arguments of economic and engineering efficiency (which are only tacitly ideological)." 16 To Lovins's credit, he consistently argued that the social consequences of energy choices were, in the last analysis, the most important aspect of energy policy making. In his widely read Soft Energy Paths, Lovins called attention to "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation" and other grave problems that·afflict conventional energy solutions. Lovins compares "two energy paths that are distinguished by their antithetical social implications." He notes that basing energy decisions on social criteria may appear to involve a "heroic decision," that is, "doing something the more expensive way because it is desirable on other more important grounds than internal cost." But Lovins is careful not to appeal to his readers' sense of courage or altruism. "Surprisingly," he writes, "a heroic deci- sion does not seem to be necessary in this case, because the energy system that seems socially more attractive is also cheaper and easier." 17 But what if the analysis had shown the contrary?

Would Lovins have been prepared to give up the social advantages believed to exist along the soft energy path? Would he have accepted "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation," and the like? Here Lovins yielded ground that in recent history has again and again been abandoned as lost territory. It raises the question of whether even the best intentioned, best qualified analysts in technological decision making are anything more than mere efficiency worshippers. Much the same strategy often appears in the arguments of those who favor democratic self-management, decentralization, and human-scale technology. As Paul Goodman once noted, "Now, if lecturing at a college, I happen to mention that some function of society which is highly centralized could be much decentralized without loss of efficiency, or perhaps with a gain in efficiency, at once the students want to talk about nothing else." 18 That approach is, indeed, one way of catching people's attention; if you can get away with it, it is certainly a most convincing kind of argument. Because the idea of efficiency attracts a wide consensus, it is sometimes used as a conceptual Trojan horse by those who have more challenging political agendas they hope to smuggle in. But victories won in this way are in other respects great losses. For they affirm in our words and in our methodologies that there are certain human ends that no longer dare be spoken in public. Lingering in that stuffy Trojan horse too long, even soldiers of virtue eventually suffocate.

**This primacy of technique turns the case and causes extinction**

**WILKINSON 1964** (John, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, forward to The Technological Society by Jacques Ellul)

It should not be imagined, however, that the universal concentration camp which Ellus thinks is coming into being in all technical societies without exception will be felt as harsh or restrictive by its inmates. Hitler’s concentration camps of hobnailed boots were symptoms of a deficient political technique. The denizen of the technological state of the future will have everything his heart ever desired, **except**, of course, his **freedom**. Admittedly, modern man, forced by technique to become in reality and without residue the imaginary producer-consumer of the classical economists, shows disconcertingly little regard for his lost freedom; but, according to Ellul, there are ominous signs that human spontaneity, which in the rational and ordered technical society has no expression except madness, is only too capable of outbreaks of irrational **suicidal destructiveness**.

The escape valves of modern literature and art, which technique has contrived, may or may not turn out to be adequate to the harmless release of the pent-up “ecstatic” energies of the human being. Technique, which can in principle only oppose technical and quantitative solutions to technical problems, must, in such a case, seek out other technical safety valves. It could, for example, convince men that they were happy and contented by means of drugs, even though they were visibly suffering from the worst kind of spiritual and material privation. It is obvious that *all such ultimate technical measures* must cause the last meager “idealistic” motifs of the whole technical enterprise to disappear. Ellul does not specifically say so, but it seems that he must hold that the technological society, like everything else, bears within itself the **seeds of its own destruction.**

It must not be imagined that the autonomous technique envisioned by Ellul is a kind of “technological determinism,” to use a phrase of Veblen. It may sometimes seem so, but only because all human institutions, like the motions of all physical bodies, have a certain permanence, or vis inertiae, which makes it highly probably that the near future of statistical aggregations will see them continue more or less in the path of the immediate past. Things could have eventuated in the technological society otherwise than they have.

Technique, to Ellul, is a “blind” force, but one which unfortunately seems to be more perspicacious than the best discernible human intelligences. There *are* other ways out, Ellul maintains, but nobody wants any part of them.

Ellul’s insistence that the technical phenomenon is not a determinism is not weakened by the enumeration (in the second chapter) of five conditions which are said to be “necessary and sufficient” for its outburst in the recent past, since the sufficient conditions for the conditions (for example, the causes of the population explosion) are not ascertainable.

The inertia of the technical phenomenon guarantees not only the continued refinement and production of relatively beneficial articles such as flush toilets and wonder drugs, but also the emergence of those unpredictable secondary effects which are always the result of ecological meddling and which today are of such magnitude and acceleration that they can scarcely be reconciled with even semistable equilibrium conditions of society. Nuclear explosions and population explosions capture the public’s imagination; but I have argued that Ellul’s analysis demands that *all* indices of modern technological culture are exploding, too, and are potentially just as dangerous to the continued well-being of society, if by well-being we understand social equilibrium.

**The alternative is to reject the 1AC- only this iconoclastic rejection of the ‘technique’ opens up a space for truly reasonable debate**

**KOWALSKI AND HALUZA-DE LAY 2011** (Nathan, St. Joseph’s College; Randolph, King’s University College, “Homo Energeticus: An Ellulian Analysis of the Alberta Tar Sands,” Dec 17, http://www.academia.edu/1216875/Homo\_energeticus\_Jacques\_Ellul\_on\_the\_Alberta\_Oilsands)

Kevin Garrison summarizes thus: modern techno-logic is “a continual move toward rationalizing all aspects of human life, placing those aspects within a technical sphere, and destroying all possibilities for thinking or acting outside that sphere” (2010, p. 197). Thus, inBourdieu’s terms, technique is what the entire social system takes for granted as the conditions of practical action (“ doxa ”), the universe of the undiscussed and undisputed (Bourdieu, 1977, p.168).Whenever the technical system seems to be flawed or disagreeable in some manner, the only conceivable option is to view these problems as technical problems that technical progress will eventually solve. 3 Faith in future technology as a salvific force reinforces the prior conviction that technology is sacrosanct and cannot be in any way dispensed with. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands are presented as untouchable and therefore may only becorrected by further technical remediation. It is in this way that Ellul’s theory of techniqueamounts to the (in)famous claim that technology is autonomous . Ellul’s sociological analyses exhibit a tension between the way the society actually is, the way it wants to be, and the way itwill be if current trajectories are maintained. Our claim is that the Alberta tar sands are sold to Albertan society in terms of inevitability and irresistibility, when this is, in fact, not true.

In the end, the point of Ellul’s analysis is that techno-logic is an idea of our own thatnevertheless controls us. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands impose demands on societythat are accepted by both Albertan voters and the politicians that reiterate those demands, and thus their development is carried out as if we had no choice in the matter. In the end, however, Ellul is not the pessimist he is made out to be by critics. In spite of places where he decries atechnological tyranny, Ellul’s theological writings develop the hope that he has in the face of his sociology of technology. Put simply, he declares “we must destroy the deified religious character of technique” (Ellul 1981?, p. 89). Borrowing from his Christian background, he advocates the iconoclastic desacralization of the falsely sacrosanct technical phenomenon. But such“[i]conoclasm is possible only to the extent that one is able to give up the religious assurances of one’s culture” (Vanderburg, in Ellul, 2004, p. 129), and only if those religious assurances are notalready built into the architecture and geography of our social environment (cf. Huber 2009, p.474). Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands should be exposed as false gods, and only after such desacralization can truly reasonable debate take place as to how their development might proceed.

### 4

**Lost the UQ card we read because brent gave it to me on his computer….just oil prices high now. Probably same card from previous rounds.**

#### TBA would increase Mexico oil production from the Gulf, decreasing price on global markets

**Goldwyn 2013** [4/11; David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC; “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf]

 Mexico has been a long time reliable supplier, but its oil production has been falling steadily   since 2004. Due to constitutional constraints, foreign involvement in upstream development and   ownership of resources has been strictly limited. In 2008 minor reforms were undertaken that   loosened those restrictions, granting PEMEX greater autonomy and making it possible for some   private participation in exploration and production through incentive-based contracts with foreign   oil companies, but the impact was minimal and production has continued to fall. In 2011,   PEMEX announced the first production licensing round in Mexico in over 70 years, with 20   blocks noted for international bidders.25 For a number of years, analysts have noted that unless   the Mexican government dramatically increases the amount of PEMEX earnings it can keep for   capital investment (in 2004 PEMEX paid the government 60% of its revenues), the company   would have significant difficulties in maintaining production, not to mention expanding into more   technically complex and diverse resources. Mexico has enormous oil potential on its side of the   Gulf of Mexico and a change in policy could both change global oil markets and create a   formidable source of wealth for development of the country itself.  Change appears to be forthcoming for Mexico. In 2012 Mexico ratified the US-Mexico Transboundary Agreement that would permit foreign investment in the Mexican Gulf of Mexico if a   trans-boundary reservoir were to be found, and if companies on both sides of the reservoir wished   to cooperate. This is an effort I helped launch during my tenure at the Department of State. The   US needs to adopt implementing legislation allowing the U.S Department of Interior to   implement the agreement, and the US needs to notify the Congress, although it does not require   Senate ratification in my view. More recently, the new government of President Enrique Pena   Nieto has announced plans to undertake major reforms of the energy sector and conduct some   experimentation with Mexico’s shale oil and gas reserves. Some analysts view these reforms with  skepticism, noting that the constitutional nature of the restrictions on the energy sector may   require that any reforms are backed by a constitutional amendment, but the initiative appears to   be sincere. If the reforms are unsuccessful, the EIA estimates that Mexico, currently one of the   largest sources of oil exports to the U.S., could see its production sink as low as 1.4 mbd by 2025,   compared to 2.96 mbd in 2011. Any incremental step that Mexico can take would be helpful to   the global oil market. I am optimistic that Mexico will make significant reforms, including   constitution changes.

#### That crushes the Russian economy and undermines support for the regime

**KRAMER 12** – New York Times writer and editor (ANDREW E. “Higher Oil Prices to Pay for Campaign Promises” New York Times March 16, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/business/global/vladimir-putins-big-promises-need-fueling-by-high-oil-prices.html?\_r=2?pagewanted=print Putin Needs)

MOSCOW — In American presidential politics, high oil prices are a problem. For Vladimir V. Putin’s new presidential term in Russia, they will be a necessity — crucial to fulfilling his campaign promises to lift government spending by billions of dollars a year. But doing that without busting the Kremlin’s budget would require oil to reach and sustain a price it has never yet achieved — $150 a barrel, according to one estimate by Citigroup. No wonder economists who specialize in Russia are skeptical. (On Friday, Russia’s Ural Blend export-grade oil was trading at $120 on the global spot market.) “It’s very hard to overestimate how vulnerable the Russian economy is to external pressures” from the oil price, Sergei Guriev, the rector of the New Economic School in Moscow, said in a telephone interview. “That vulnerability is huge, which is why Russia must be very vigilant. The spending is a risk.” The promised spending is also ambitious. Mr. Putin has laid out a program of raising wages for doctors and teachers, padding retirement checks for everyone and refurbishing Russia’s military arsenal. The oil-lubricated offerings would even include a population premium: expanding the popular “baby bonus” payments the Russian government provides to mothers, to include a third child. The payment, of up to $8,300 for housing or baby-related expenses, now comes as an incentive only with each of the first two children. The additional cost of the expanded baby benefits alone will total $4.6 billion a year, according to an estimate by the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Most of Mr. Putin’s spending promises came at least partly in response to the street demonstrations by young and middle-class protesters in Moscow and other big cities challenging his authority in the weeks leading up to the March 4 election. His apparent aim was to shore up support from the rest of Russia: poorer and rural parts of the country, and from state workers and the elderly. The repercussions of his campaign promises, and an earlier commitment on military spending, could be felt for years to come, giving price swings in oil a bigger role than ever on the Russian economy. Taxes on oil and natural gas sales provide half of Russia’s government revenue. Each increase in the Russian budget equivalent to 1 percent of the gross domestic product requires a rise in the price of oil of about $10 a barrel on global markets — which is how Citigroup arrived at the $150-a-barrel figure for meeting the new obligations Mr. Putin has taken on. Analysts worry that, even if the government can fulfill its promises, too little will remain for a sovereign wealth fund that is intended as a shock absorber for the Russian economy and the ruble exchange rate during an oil price slump. Russia needed to use that buffer as recently as 2008, during the financial crisis. “The concern is simple,” Kingsmill Bond, the chief strategist at Citigroup in Russia, said in a telephone interview. “If the oil price that Russia requires to balance its budget is higher, the systemic risks that the market faces are also higher.” The bank estimated that Mr. Putin’s promises of higher wages and pensions, not counting the military outlays, add up to additional spending equal to 1.5 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product. That comes on top of an earlier pledge to spend an additional 3 percent of gross domestic product a year re-arming the military. In all, the new commitments would add up to about $98 billion a year, Citigroup estimates. The spillover from the Arab Spring and the specter of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear development plants are propping up oil prices now. But over the long term, economic stagnation in Europe could help bring them down. Even before the election, Russia’s government spending was up, helping reinforce Mr. Putin’s message that he was the best candidate to deliver prosperity and stability. In January, the Russian military ministry, for example, doubled salaries in the nation’s million-person army. It was ostensibly a long-planned move. But coming just two months before the presidential vote, the political message was clear. Also smoothing the path for Mr. Putin’s victory was a national cap on utility rates that helped keep inflation at the lowest level in Russia’s post-Soviet history for January and February, at a 3.7 percent annual pace. “Putin made large spending commitments,” the Fitch rating agency said in a statement released the day after the election. “The current high price of oil cushions Russia’s public finances,” Fitch said. “But in the absence of fiscal tightening that significantly cuts the non-oil and gas fiscal deficit, a severe and sustained drop in the oil price would have a damaging impact on the Russian economy and public finances and would likely lead to a downgrade” of the nation’s credit rating. As Mr. Putin’s spending promises started to be introduced in January, Fitch altered Russia’s outlook to stable, from positive. Mr. Putin has defended the proposed spending as necessary and just, given the hardship of teachers and other public sector workers in the post-Soviet years. “A doctor, a teacher, a professor, these people should make enough money where they work so they don’t have to look for a side job,” Mr. Putin wrote in a manifesto published during the campaign. But in fact, the government will offset a portion of the pay raises, perhaps as much as one-third of their cost, by laying off some public sector workers and trimming some other public spending. That was the word from Lev I. Yakobson, the deputy rector of the Higher School of Economics, who helped draft the policy. That part of the plan, though, was never part of Mr. Putin’s stump speech.

#### Nuclear war

**FILGER 2009** (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### China adv

#### Status quo fracking boom solves this advantage—if it doesn’t, it’s because there are no LNG terminals which they don’t solve

#### Miniscule risk of south china sea war – multiple warrants

**Moss 2-10**-2013 (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009. “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War” http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true) BW

Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers: “Don't be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.

These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one.And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict.

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan:

1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.

2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.

**3.** Question marks over **the PLA’s operational effectiveness**. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.

4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all.

**5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention**. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase.

6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).

7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.

In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations.

However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget.

Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch.

In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

#### Interests in the middle east are inevitable—counterterrorism and iran mean we’ll always cooperate on things that are actually big deals

#### Economic ties solve

Ackerman 2011 – quoting former admiral Timothy Keating, the official blog of the Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association

(Robert, 5/10/11, War Between China, U.S. Not Likely, http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own. As for Taiwan, Adm. Keating offered that with each day, the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan diminishes. Economic ties between the two governments are growing, as is social interaction. He predicts that a gradual solution to reunification is coming. The United States can hasten that process by remaining a powerful force in the region, he added.

#### Middle East war would be short and small-scale

**FERGUSON 2006** (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

### Heg adv

**Heg causes war and prolif-recalcitrant power balancing takes out the benefits of heg**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conºict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conºict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the ªrst war, **its ability to manage confrontations** between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

**Extinction**

**Asal and Beardsley 09** (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

#### Just because steel prices are high doesn’t mean we’d give up—we’d just spend more money on steel

**Hegemony is unnecessary and doesn’t solve anything**   
**Preble 10 -** director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, Ph.D. in history from Temple University (Christopher, 8/13, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?”) <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>)   
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short, we shouldn’t have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the military is designed to implement, must come from other quarters.

**Russia is switching to a defensive/diplomatic strategy**

**Vostok 13** [Vostok is a blog about Russia and Eastern Europe – yesterday, today, and tomorrow. “What’s new about Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept?” <http://vostokcable.wordpress.com/2013/04/11/whats-new-about-russias-new-foreign-policy-concept/> Aprill 11]//BMitch

When Vladimir Putin approved the new [Foreign Policy Concept](http://mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) of the Russian Federation in February 2013, he was following a precedent for incoming Russian Presidents to set forth their foreign policy objectives at the beginning of their term. Yeltsin did so in 1993, Putin in 2000 and Medvedev in 2008. The process has become streamlined and professionalised, leading to the suspicion that Putin has little new to reveal to the world. Indeed, Fyodor Lukyanov wrote in [Global Affairs](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Russian-Diplomats-Move-in-to-the-Real-World-15860) that this new “concept” does not mark a watershed in Russian foreign policy ideas. In terms of the bigger picture, Lukyanov is right in emphasising the switch from Cold War language to greater efforts at diplomacy. The analyst Dmitri Trenin in a Twitter Q&A with the public, including Vostok Cable, said that the new Foreign Policy Concept is “defensive in principle”, along the same line as the Military Strategy, and is principally concerned with the strategic independence of the Russian Federation. Pragmatism continues to be the guiding principle, and apprehension for Russia’s sovereignty the main goal. Russia is opposed to any interference in its own conduct in and sees the UN (and the Security Council in particular) purely as forums for resolving conflicts and disputes in accordance with international law. The document also shows signs of continuity in its structure and its understanding of the world as a multipolar environment, where the West has lost the monopoly on economics and politics and the Eurasian and Asia-Pacific regions are surging as new powers that contribute to the building of stable, rather than competitive, international relations. Moreover, the explicit reference to Russia’s understanding of human rights and economic cooperation has been a constant since 2000. The same goes for the Russian “concentric circles” in which post-Soviet countries are viewed as crucial allies and NATO a necessary interlocutor, albeit still an expansionist threat. Some of the sentences used in the 2008 Concept are kept to the letter. Notably, the lack of improvement in Russia-UK relations continues to be emphasised: “Russia would like the potential for interaction with Great Britain to be used along the same lines.” (Art. 60) However, the new Concept introduced two main “revolutions” that have not been detected by most analysts so far: emphasis on the use of “soft power” and a peculiar interpretation of world economics. The term “soft power”, мягкая сила, is directly borrowed from the English language definition and describes its boundaries according to shared diplomatic customs (Art. 20).

### Wetlands adv

#### Alt cause to the environment - Cuba

Almeida ‘12

Rob Almeida is Partner/CMO at gCaptain. He graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1999 with a B.S in Naval Architecture and spent 6.5 years on active duty as a Surface Warfare Officer. He worked for a year as a Roughneck/Rig Manager trainee on board the drillship Discoverer Americas. May 18th – http://gcaptain.com/drilling-cuba-embargo-badly/

In short however, Cuba’s access to containment systems, offshore technology, and spill response equipment is severely restricted by the US embargo, yet if a disaster occurs offshore, not only will Cuban ecosystems be severely impacted, but those of the Florida Keys, and US East Coast.¶ If disaster strikes offshore Cuba, US citizens will have nobody else to blame except the US Government because outdated policies are impacting the ability to prepare sufficiently for real-life environmental threats. Considering Cuba waters are home to the highest concentration of biodiversity in the region and is a spawning ground for fish populations that migrate north into US waters, a Cuban oil spill could inflict unprecedented environmental devastation if not planned for in advance.

**No impact to soil erosion - all hype**

Simon 97Julian L. Simon teaches business at the University of Maryland and is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. "Digging Deeper Into the Soil Erosion Scam," June 3, CATO, https://www.google.com/search?sugexp=chrome,mod=13&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=Digging+Deeper+Into+the+Soil+Erosion+Scam

This program is part-and-parcel of the most conclusive discredited environmental-political fraud of recent times, the National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) set up in 1980 by the Agriculture Department. This organization created a huge media scare about farmland being ruined by two supposedly related forces, urbanization of farmland and the erosion of fields.¶ Both scares were quickly disproven. The amazing part is that the assertions were eventually acknowledged to be false by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. That is, even the original purveyors of the false facts about the "vanishing farmland crisis" ended up agreeing that the widely reported scare was without foundation. But the scares did not die, and are back with us again. ¶ Here is the saga: Headlines like these began to appear in the newspapers about 1980: "The peril of vanishing farmlands" (the New York Times). "Farmland losses could end U.S. food exports" (Chicago Tribune). "Vanishing farmlands: selling out the soil" (Saturday Review), and "As world needs food, U.S. keeps losing soil to land developers" (Wall Street Journal). The stories claimed that the urbanization-of-farmland rate had jumped from the 1960s to the 1970s from less than 1 million acres per year to 3 million acres per year. This assertion was wholly untrue as we shall see. ¶ Then in a Jan. 11, 1983, speech President Reagan said, "I think we are all aware of the need to do something about soil erosion." The headline on a June 4, 1984, Newsweek "My Turn" article typified how the issue was presented: "A step away from the Dust Bowl." More recently, we have such statements as that of Vice President Al Gore about how "8 acres' worth of prime topsoil floats past Memphis every hour," and that Iowa "used to have an average of 16 inches of the best topsoil in the world. Now it is down to 8 inches "¶ These are the scam-busting facts: The long-run trend in the decades up to 1970 was about 1 million acres of total land urbanized per year. The Soil Conservation Service in conjunction with NALS asserted that the rate then jumped to 3 million acres yearly from 1967 to 1975 or 1977. Scholars at several universities and think tanks found that the 3 million-acres-a-year rate was most implausible in light of data from other sources. And we found that the survey on which the NALS based its claim employed a faulty polling technique and had amazing huge errors in arithmetic.¶ The soil erosion claims were **equally** ridiculous. According to the USDA, only a tiny proportion of cropland--3 percent--is so erosive that no management practices can help much. Seventy-seven percent of cropland erodes at rates below 5 tons per acre each year, the equilibrium rate at which new soil is formed below the surface; that is, most cropland erodes less than the "no net loss rate." Just 15 percent of U.S. cropland "is moderately erosive and eroding about a 5-ton tolerance. Erosion on the land could be reduced with improved management practices," though this does not necessarily mean the land is in danger or is being managed uneconomically.¶ In short, the aggregate data on the condition of farm and the rate of erosion do not support the concern about soil erosion. What's more, the data suggest that the condition of cropland has been improving rather than worsening. Theodore W. Schultz, the only agricultural economist to win a Nobel Prize, and Leo V. Mayer of the USDA, both wrote very forcefully that the danger warnings were false. Mr. Schultz cited not only research but also his own lifetime recollections starting as a farm boy in the Dakotas in the 1930s.¶ But even a Nobel laureate's efforts could not slow the public-relations juggernaut that successfully co-opted the news media, won the minds of the American public, and were used to justify the USDA giveaways.¶ So far, the story is unremarkable--another environmental scare disproven. But in this case there was a remarkable development: In 1984, the USDA's own Soil Conservation Service issued a paper by Susan Lee that completely reversed the earlier scare figures and confirmed the estimates by the independent scholars.¶ And the accompanying press release made it clear that the former estimates were now being retracted. "[T]he acreage classified as urban and built-up land was 46.6 million acres in 1982, compared to 64.7 million acres reported in 1977." Please read that again. It means that whereas in 1977 the SCS had declared that 64.7 million acres had been "lost" to built-up land, just five years later SCS admitted that the actual total was 46.6 million acres. That is, the 1977 estimate was admitted to be fully 50 percent too high, a truly amazing error for something so easy to check toughly as the urbanized acreage of the U.S.¶ With unusual candor, the USDA press release added, "The 1977 estimate thus appears to have been markedly overstated."¶ The USDA press release of April 10,1984, contained a second bombshell: "The average annual rate of soil erosion on cultivated cropland dropped from 5.1 tons per acre to 4.8 tons per acre." That is, erosion was lessening rather than getting worse, exactly the opposite of what NALS claimed. And this finding undercuts the new USDA program being proposed now.

**Alt causes to hydrogen cycle**

Edmonton Journal 8 (Elaine O’Connor, “World's oceans at risk of becoming soupy swill; Rising temperatures, runoff toxins creating 'dead zones'” 9/15/2008, www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=3c40fbee-40e4-443a-b736-c70c6072649e)

VANCOUVER - Sally Cole came home from a sailing trip in August looking forward to a hot shower. But when she turned on her tap, all she got was slime. "I turned on the tap and it just flooped. Just a bit of viscous gloop came out. It was really horrible," said the resident of B.C's Saltspring Island between the mainland and Vancouver Island. The culprit was an algae bloom on the nearby lake that had choked the water pipes of hundreds of the area's residents. It took three days to clear. The incident is one example of how seas and lakes are suffocating in slime. That toxic slime -- algae feasting on pollutants and fertilizers, and starving the ocean of oxygen -- is killing off sea life at an alarming rate. A new study published in August reveals the world's "dead zones" have doubled in size every decade since 1960. Coastal waters with once rich marine life -- Chesapeake Bay, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and off Peru, Chile and Namibia -- are rapidly losing species. According to the report by two U.S. scientists, there are 405 asphyxiating dead zones in our oceans. The cause, predictably, is pollution. The culprits are fertilizer runoff in estuaries, sewage, global warming, overfishing and industrial waste. Millions of tonnes of "nutrient pollution" -- chemical fertilizer that adds phosphates and nitrogen to the water -- feed algae blooms. Some zones are vast -- the Baltic Sea's 70,000-square-kilometre aquatic graveyard is the largest. The Gulf of Mexico harbours North America's giant dead zone: A 22,000-square-km sea morgue, or something roughly the size of New Jersey. Other dead zones have been discovered off California, in Lake Erie, around the Florida Keys, in North and South Carolina creeks and in Washington's Puget Sound. Together, they have turned 246,048 square kilometres of the seas -- an area the equivalent of all five of the Great Lakes -- into marine wastelands. Robert Diaz, a Virginia Institute of Marine Science professor and co-author of the study, says the problem is already evident in Canadian waters. In B.C., a dead zone was first spotted in the Saanich Inlet in 1960. Dead zones have been recorded in P.E.I. fish-farming bays since 2000. If fish swim into a dead zone, they often become unconscious and cannot escape. Shellfish and bottom-dwellers move too slowly, so a stew of rotting marine life is left behind. Even when fish survive in low-oxygen water, research shows their reproduction suffers, which could jeopardize wild fish stocks. Diaz says this could be catastrophic for our local marine life and aquaculture. He says zones are likely to intensify as their contributing factors of algal blooms and intensive fish-farming are "problems that will continue into the future." Already, the impact of ocean deterioration is being felt all along the Pacific coast. Fishermen are bringing up cages of dead Dungeness crabs and salmon researchers have found low oxygen from the Columbia River on Oregon border's to northern Washington. As fish stocks fall, seabird populations are dying of starvation. Deadly algae are also becoming common on the Pacific West Coast. They have been blamed for the erratic behaviour and mass die-offs of sea mammals since some algae act as neurotoxins and impair brain function. Some 14,000 seals, sea lions and dolphins have washed up sick or dead in California in the last 10 years, and 650 grey whales have beached. Deadly algae have been a problem in the region since the 1980s, but scientists say they're increasingly frequent and intense. Algae is also storming international seas and claiming human victims. Near Sweden, cyanobacteria blooms at times turn the Baltic Sea into a brown slush that makes residents' eyes burn. On Florida's Gulf Coast, toxic tides have killed hundreds of manatees and caused breathing problems for area residents. Algae has smothered 80 per cent of coral reefs in the Caribbean and ruined 75 per cent of California's fish-rich kelp forests. Poison day-glo-green caulerpa algae is killing fish off the coasts of 11 countries. What will become of our oceans? One U.S. oceanographer has a succinct answer: slime. Jeremy Jackson, a Scripps Institution of Oceanography professor, released a report in August warning of "mass extinction" in oceans due to dead zones, global warming, overfishing, pollution, ocean acidification, ecosystem destruction and invasive species.

## 2NC

### CP

#### They’ll agree on the senate bill inevitably

McLernon 10/15 - Sean McLernon, a reporter for a legal news publication [“US-Mexico Border Drilling Bill Sails Through Senate” <http://www.law360.com/articles/480221/us-mexico-border-drilling-bill-sails-through-senate>]

Law360, New York (October 15, 2013, 5:46 PM ET) -- The [U.S. Senate](http://www.law360.com/agencies/u-s-senate) on Saturday unanimously approved legislation enacting a 2012 accord with Mexico that expands offshore drilling development by opening up approximately 1.5 million additional acres in the Gulf of Mexico for energy projects.¶ The bill authorizing the secretary of the interior to implement the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement easily made it through the Senate with bipartisan support. A more controversial House of Representatives version of the bill [passed in June](http://www.law360.com/articles/453823/house-passes-bill-to-enact-us-mexico-drilling-deal), and now the two bodies must resolve the differences before the measure reaches the president's desk. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa signed the accord in February 2012. The agreement, if enacted, would end the moratorium on oil exploration and production along the western gap portion of the Gulf of Mexico. Mexico ratified the agreement in April 2012. The deal allows U.S. leaseholders and Mexican state-owned petroleum company Pemex to work together to develop transboundary reservoirs through so-called unitization agreements, which both governments need to review and approve before they go into effect. It also helps minimize safety and environmental risks that would have come with unilateral exploration, according to the [White House](http://www.law360.com/agencies/the-white-house). The agreement unlocks an area for drilling that contains as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, according to U.S. Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management estimates. The White House supports Congressional approval of the deal but criticized the House for including a provision that waives a requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act requiring energy companies to disclose payments made to foreign governments. House Democrats said the provision waiving the disclosure requirement hinders U.S. efforts to increase transparency and accountability in the oil and gas industry. House Republicans argued, however, that foreign-controlled energy companies could develop the resource without revealing royalty payments. The House voted 256-171 in June to pass the bill, which gained the support of just 28 Democrats. The Senate version has received support from industry groups, including the [American Petroleum Institute](http://www.law360.com/companies/american-petroleum-institute-inc). API Upstream and Industry Operations Group Director Erik Milito told the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that the agreement should be implemented as soon as possible, and the Senate bill would make that happen. “Swift implementation of the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement is important to providing regulatory certainty and will allow companies to make investments in these boundary areas with the knowledge that there is a framework in place to allow for orderly extraction of these resources,” Milito said during his testimony. The U.S. is Mexico's largest supplier of refined oil products, mostly coming from U.S. refineries based in the Gulf Coast. Mexico is consistently one of the top three exporters of oil to the U.S., according to the White House.

### K

**Adapting humans to technology results in inequality, dehumanization, and the eclipse of culture**

**ELLUL 1989** (Jacques, French sociologist and philosopher but not like totally mainstream like the other ones, What I Believe, Trans. Bromiley, http://www.jesusradicals.com/wp-content/uploads/what.pdf)

Thus one of the great themes today is technological culture. We are supposedly adding technological knowledge to our humanist legacy. At least this is not an attempt to raise technology to the rank of a true culture, to find in it a source of values, intelligence, a critical spirit, a universalism. A technological culture is in fact impossible, for technology is the negation of culture. We find a similar desire to show that technology becomes social inasmuch as it simplifies and amplifies social actions, or that it creates a new art. This is merely playing with words; there is no substance to it. The art created by painters, sculptors, and musicians imitates what technology alone proposes and permits and has nothing in common with what has been produced as art, and called such up to about 1930, since Prehistoric times.2 People are always talking about humanizing technology, but this talk has no effect whatever on its development. All questioning of technology on basic grounds (e.g, by ecology and the ecological movement in its early days) has either been ruthlessly dismissed or integrated into the technological world. This world sometimes seems capable of producing a counterforce, for in the period of transition from one environment to another susceptibilities have to be taken into account. Thus we find the concern for human relations in the 1950s and the movement of technology assessment today. But these simply serve to allay disquiet and thus to make development easier.

The second result of the domination of this environment is that human beings have to adapt to it and accept total change. At issue here is not just a slight modification or adaptation but an essential transformation. A first aspect of this radical adaptation concerns the relation between human beings and machines. If machines have to be perfectly adapted to us, the reverse is unavoidable. We have to be exactly what is useful for machines, **their** perfect **complement**. Human life is no longer merely a matter of muscle and reflex. We now have to have our gadgets. We can see the mutation very clearly and decisively in the academic world. The humanities are now disparaged. Traditional culture is valueless relative to machines. At the beginning of the 20th century, and again in 1930, people in the industrial and commercial world began to ask what good such studies as history and Greek are. How can they help us to make money or to forge ahead economically? Today we are putting much the same question, but in a new way: How do they serve the technological world? How do they make us a proper complement for machines? This is why there is such an incredible stress on information in our schools. The important thing is to prepare young people to enter the world of information, able to handle computers, but knowing only the reasoning, the language, the combinations, and the connections between computers. This movement is invading the whole intellectual domain and also that of conscience.

But this is not the only feature. Part of the human mutation is the appearance and consecration of the human guinea pig in furtherance of science and technology. Since science and technology are plainly dominant, we have to test their effects and usefulness on people. Experiments are becoming ever more numerous and varied. I was horrified many years ago to learn that in the United States, for scientific reasons (to study the evolution of the embryo), pregnant women were being paid to have an abortion at a given stage, and we have gone much further than that today. Remedies, pharmaceutical products, are being tested on people for pay. There is experimentation in the field of what is everywhere called genetic makeup. We are growing used to the idea that people are simply guinea pigs upon whom it is quite legitimate to conduct scientific experiments. "Humanity is our most precious resource" is a slogan that has been taken up in many forms the last few years. But let us remember that if humanity is only a resource, this implies that we may treat humanity as simply a factor in economic production. Leases are taken out on resources. In the genetic field there seems to be no limit to what can be done (implants, test-tube babies, surrogate mothers, etc.). The imagination has free rein. But genetic manipulation is designed to produce exactly the type of people that we need. Much has been made of the book 1984, but what is in prospect is really Huxley's Brave New World. From birth individuals are to be adapted specially to perform various services in society. They are to be so perfectly adapted physiologically that there will be no maladjustment, no revolt, no looking elsewhere. The combination of genetic makeup and educational specialization will make people adequate to fulfill their technological functions.

Beyond that, American experiments directly on the brain have shown that the implantation of minute electrodes (with the consent of the subject) might induce specific impressions, desires, and pleasures, and effect obedience to orders no matter who gives them and with no need for speech. At an experimental stage this has caused no scandal. But is it not apparent that this new form of intervention in human nature will finally suppress human freedom altogether, will bring about complete obedience without choice, and will result in the perfect adaptation that technology needs? People will no longer be a hindrance to proper conduct. The more perfect technology becomes, the more refined and complex and subtle and swift its processes, the more human conduct has to be perfect. We can no longer dream or forget or have other centers of interest. An instrument panel in an automated factory is no place for the recalling of poetry. The technological environment demands a radical transformation of humanity. Previously human adaptation followed the slow rhythm of evolution from generation to generation. Only over centuries did people become social, political, and urban. No one decided for them that they had to follow this pattern. Today the technological environment is coming upon us very quickly. Technology develops with ever increasing speed. In every sector and in all directions the new environment is being formed explosively. Hence human adaptation to it cannot be extended over many centuries. We have to adjust rapidly.

Examination of the last thirty years will be enough to demonstrate this incredible rapidity. Technology cannot wait, for it soon becomes unusable. Everything has to be done in a single generation. Nor can the adaptation be spontaneous, following our physiological and intellectual rhythm. To move quickly, we have to move by act of will. We cannot wait for progressive and cumulative adaptations. We have to create at once the kind of people that machines demand. Human language has already been modified to become that of the computer. Some numbers and letters have been modified so as to correspond exactly to the form that the computer gives them. This is an almost unrecognizable occurrence, yet it is of major importance.

A problem arises, however. For a long time those who have been genetically manipulated so as to conform to the technological model will be a small minority. Most people will still be at the social stage or even the natural stage. What will be the relations between these groups? They will certainly not understand one another. There will be no more in common between them than in the transition from the first to the second stage there was between nomadic brigands and the first city merchants five thousand years ago. On the one hand there will be a kind of aristocracy marked off by its total and infallible adaptation to technical gadgets and the technological system, and on the other hand there will be a vast number of people who are outdated, who cannot use the technology, who are powerless, who are still at the social stage but who live in a technological environment for which they are totally unadapted.

In this respect I must make a final observation. When I talk about adaptation, readers might think that I mean adjustment to various minor differences in environment. Thus people in hot countries adjust their clothes and habits and customs accordingly. But the changes of environment that I have in mind demand a total and fundamental mutation, so that I am inclined to say that the Prehistoric people of the natural environment had nothing in common with the historical people of the social environment, and that we are now witnessing a mutation of the same order. We have only to think how alien the bushmen or aborigines of Australia were to all that the 19th century regarded as human nature. By a change of environment what is regarded as human nature in one epoch is transformed and a new model of humanity emerges. It might be argued that I am exaggerating and that the environment cannot have this impact on human nature. But that argument is a mere hypothesis based on the conviction that there is such a thing as an inalienable and basically identical human nature. For my part, I am not so sure. Furthermore, no one has ever been able to say clearly what this human nature really is.

Nevertheless, I have still to answer a question of my own. Why have I given this sketch of the development of three environments in a book entitled What I Believe? It is true that at a first glance all that I have written here seems to have nothing to do with my fundamental beliefs, with what is fundamentally existential for me. Yet at root what I have presented is not a scientific theory. I cannot prove the impact of the environment or the relation of human beings to it. I do not pretend to be able to give strict answers to the many questions that. confront anthropologists, ethnologists, and historians. I have put forward a simple hypothesis. But all hypotheses include a great deal of intuition and belief. Conversely, all beliefs finally express themselves in hypotheses which will be more or less strict and more or less daring, but which we have to take into account if we are to get the complete picture of an epoch. I would say in fact that this relation of human beings to their environment and these changes of environment do form part of what I believe. And if some disappointed readers are tempted to say: "And is this all that Jacques Ellul believes?" I would reply that what is at issue here is evaluating the danger of what might happen to our humanity in the present half-century, and distinguishing between what we want to keep and what we are ready to lose, between what we can welcome as legitimate human development and what we should reject with our last ounce of strength as dehumanization. I cannot think that choices of this kind are unimportant. What I believe with this theory of three environments has to do very definitely with the need to formulate what kind of humanity we want and what kind we repudiate. The relevance of this aspect of what I believe is by no means negligible.

**The K is a prereq to education – the goal of education in modern society is to create technicians – the kritik unlocks education for education’s sake- the alternative makes us slaves to the machine**

**Ellul 1964** (Jacques, French sociologist and philosopher The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson )//BMitch

When a SOCiety becomes increasingly totalitarian ( and I say «SOCiety," not "state"), it creates more and more difficulties of adaptation and requires its citizens to be conformist in the same degree. Thus, this technique becomes all the more necessary. I have no doubt that it makes men better balanced and "happier." And there is the danger. It makes men happy in a milieu which normally would have made them unhappy, if they had not been worked on, molded, and fonned for just that milieu. What looks like the apex of humanism is in fact the pinnacle of human sub­ mission: children are educated to become precisely what society expects of them. They must have social consciences that allow them to strive for the same ends as society sets for itself. Clearly, when modem youth are fully educated in the new psyd.uptJagogic technique, many social and political difficulties will disappear. Any fonn of government or social transfonnation becomes possible with individuals who have experienced this never-ending process of adaptation. The key word of the new human technique. is, there­ fore, adaptation, and we shall come upon it repeatedly as we con­ sider each of these techniques separately. The new pedagogical methods correspond exactly to the role assigned to education in modem technical society. The Napoleonic conception that the Lycees must furnish administtators for the state and managers for the economy, in confonnity w�th social needs and tendencies, has become world-wide in its extent. Ac­ cording to this conception, education no longer has a humanist end or any value in itself; it has only one goal, **to create technicians**. A survey conducted by the newspaper Combat in 1950 appeared under the headline: Higher Education Ha.t No Relction to Indus­ trial Needs. A survey conducted by Le Monde in 1952 began with the words: "There are too many haH-baked intellectuals and not enough technicians." It would be useless to multiply such refer­ ences. They are literally infinite in number since they express every­ body's feelings in the matter. Instruction must be useful in life. Today's life is technique. It follows. then, that instruction must above all else be technical. This is all very well for the individual preoccupied with finding a trade or a profession; but we find the same tendency when we look at society as a whole. Technique has again effected the reconciliation of individual and society. Education, even in France, is becoming oriented toward the spe­ cialized end of producing technicians; and. as a consequence, to­ ward the creation of individuals **useful only as members of a tech­ nical group**, on the basis of the current criteria of utility-individ­ uals who conform to the structure and the needs of the technical group. The intelligentsia will no longer be a model, a conscience, or an animating intellectual spirit for the group, even in the sense of performing a critical function. They will be the **servants**, the most conformist imaginable, of the instruments of technique. As Louis Couffignal puts it, the human brain must be made to conform to the much more advanced brain of the machine. And education will no longer be an unpredictable and exciting adventure in human enlightenment, but an exercise in conformity and an ap­ prenticeship to whatever gadgetry is useful in a technical world.

The way in which we describe policies should be evaluated prior to the results– this does not mean they can’t weigh impacts, rather that our kritik is a prior question– this is the most logical and is vital for policymaking

Neta **Crawford**, **2002**. PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Professor of Political Science @ Brown. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21.

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- **must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place**. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

Policy education from debate is unrealistic – therefore unpredictable and useless

CLAUDE 1988 (Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of *policy* and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the *Genesis* theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

Identifying with the state scapegoats it for violence which allows evil to continue

Shaffer 2007 [Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. <http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html>]

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, [They Thought They Were Free](http://www.amazon.com/They-Thought-Were-Free-Germans/dp/0226511928/lewrockwell/), most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., [Flying Tigers](http://www.amazon.com/Flying-Tigers-John-Wayne/dp/0782011276/lewrockwell/)) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

**Concern for efficiency can’t be combined with our critique—technological thought will overrun our concern for political change no matter how good the aff’s intentions are**

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

Even those who held unorthodox viewpoints in this debate found it necessary to uphold the supreme importance of this criterion. Thus, Amory B. Lovins, a leading proponent ofsoft energy paths, wrote of his method: "While not under the illusion that facts are separable from values, I have tried ... to separate my personal preferences from my analytic assumptions and to rely not on modes of discourse that might be viewed as overtly ideological, but rather on classicial arguments of economic and engineering efficiency (which are only tacitly ideological)." 16 To Lovins's credit, he consistently argued that the social consequences of energy choices were, in the last analysis, the most important aspect of energy policy making. In his widely read Soft Energy Paths, Lovins called attention to "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation" and other grave problems that·afflict conventional energy solutions. Lovins compares "two energy paths that are distinguished by their antithetical social implications." He notes that basing energy decisions on social criteria may appear to involve a "heroic decision," that is, "doing something the more expensive way because it is desirable on other more important grounds than internal cost." But Lovins is careful not to appeal to his readers' sense of courage or altruism. "Surprisingly," he writes, "a heroic deci- sion does not seem to be necessary in this case, because the energy system that seems socially more attractive is also cheaper and easier." 17 But what if the analysis had shown the contrary?

Would Lovins have been prepared to give up the social advantages believed to exist along the soft energy path? Would he have accepted "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation," and the like? Here Lovins yielded ground that in recent history has again and again been abandoned as lost territory. It raises the question of whether even the best intentioned, best qualified analysts in technological decision making are anything more than mere efficiency worshippers. Much the same strategy often appears in the arguments of those who favor democratic self-management, decentralization, and human-scale technology. As Paul Goodman once noted, "Now, if lecturing at a college, I happen to mention that some function of society which is highly centralized could be much decentralized without loss of efficiency, or perhaps with a gain in efficiency, at once the students want to talk about nothing else." 18 That approach is, indeed, one way of catching people's attention; if you can get away with it, it is certainly a most convincing kind of argument. Because the idea of efficiency attracts a wide consensus, it is sometimes used as a conceptual Trojan horse by those who have more challenging political agendas they hope to smuggle in. But victories won in this way are in other respects great losses. For they affirm in our words and in our methodologies that there are certain human ends that no longer dare be spoken in public. Lingering in that stuffy Trojan horse too long, even soldiers of virtue eventually suffocate.

#### Oil extraction in Mexico is neo-colonialism-maintains asymmetry in power dynamics

**de Regil, , The Jus Semper Global Alliance, 2004**

(Alvaro, “The Neo-Capitalist Assault in Mexico: Democracy vis-à-vis the logic of the market”, <http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Economic%20Data/Resources/Neo-capAssaultMexico.pdf>)

North-South relationships, from the post-war onward, keep the asymmetric structures that continue to amply benefit the metropolis and their partners in the periphery. Despite the repeated demands to balance the terms of trade for the commodities of the Third World in the last fifty years, the North always maintained an absolute negative, as it continues to do to this date, to open its markets to the primary products of the South. Nonetheless, the countries of the Third World demand for decades from the U.S. and the rest of the G7 a treatment similar to that given to Europe and Japan during the period of reconstruction, asking for asymmetric conditions to benefit their terms of trade. It is thought that it should be of considerable importance for the U.S. to develop the South so to insure the long-term growth of the world’s capitalist economy and to eliminate the possibility of the advancement of communism in the Third World. It is a demand similar to that applied to equalize the development of the countries of the European Mediterranean basin. But the big powers openly refuse to support the South’s development. Thus, the failure of the recent WTO conference in Cancun is not at all surprising. The fact is that the South plays a fundamental role in the world’s capitalist exploitative system. Besides the advantageous conditions for the North in the terms of trade in the exchange of goods and services, the North also extracts profit margins far greater from its operations in the South. Selling manufactured products at high prices and buying cheap commodities is one thing, but directly participating in the exploitation of the South’s natural resources represents far greater benefits. Often enough, with the direct support of the South’s oligarchies, incredible conditions for the extraction of resources are obtained, including the labour used, which are then commercialised globally –these are precisely the conditions that moved Cardenas to expropriate the oil. In the case of manufacturing, the royalties for the use of licences and brands are typically one of the best profits sources for the North. And if a transnational decides to invest in the South, it is because the comparative advantages guaranteed by the oligarchies, especially in labour, secure profit margins far greater than those obtained in the North. This has been the essential role of the oligarchies in the centre-periphery holy alliance. Besides offering wages perversely miserable, the governments from the South offer all kinds of fiscal incentives and an infrastructure to attract foreign direct investment and compete amongst themselves to offer the most beneficial conditions to the transnationals and least beneficial for their countries in exchange for a small share in the operation and their support to remain in power. This scheme has generated incredible comparative advantages for the North. In 1978 the income of U.S. transnationals in the South accounted for 35% of their total foreign income, despite the South accounting for only 25% of their investments, because the South’s productivity was 65% greater at the expense of the misery of workers. 5 This partnership between big capital in the North and the oligarchies of the South, the only ones benefiting from the arrangement, is the key factor behind NAFTA. It is a re-edition of neo-colonialism where the centre and the periphery not only participate in an asymmetric exchange of manufactured products and commodities, but where transnationals already have as well direct control of almost all sectors of the Mexican economy and of the factors of production, including the unrestrained use of labour, with the total connivance of the political-entrepreneurial oligarchy. Economists such as Prebisch and Ankie Hoogvelt depict this relationship within the so-called Dependency Theory. 6 The theory argues that the North acts upon the South with a predatory attitude and imposes its political will, and if necessary its military power, to extract the asymmetric conditions that it wants. The North requires the natural resources as well as labour and the sale of its machinery, finished products and technology to sustain the economic growth of its corporations. The terms of trade and foreign investment are negatively asymmetric, thus; at the end, it extracts a net benefit extraordinarily favourable. Unfortunately, except for Asian countries such as South Korea that give priority to social welfare by following its own model, the great majority of governments in the South elect the easy way of partnering with the North. It is precisely this relationship, where the Mexican political-entrepreneurial oligarchy continues to choose to remain a client of the centres of power of global capital that continues to block Mexico’s development.

### Heg adv

**There isn’t actually an impact to expansionsism…the U.S. just wants someone to get mad at**

[Armstrong](http://english.ruvr.ru/by_author/94378709/) 4/18 [Patrick, Analysis, Ottawa, Canada “Russia is not very pertinent to Washington’s strategic and security concerns: it is not threatening nuclear war today – expert” <http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_18/Russia-is-not-very-pertinent-to-Washington-s-strategic-and-security-concerns-it-is-not-threatening-nuclear-war-today-expert/> 2013]//BMitch

Countries enjoy claiming highfalutin values and principles as justification for their often sordid actions. But these principles are usually pretty malleable. Washington, for example, was firm on the principle of inviolability of borders in the Georgian case in 2008 but less so in Yugoslavia in 1999; Moscow firmly held the opposite position each time. Moscow was supportive of the human rights of Ossetians but not so much about those of Kosovars; Washington, again, the opposite. Each was adept at manufacturing reasons why the inviolable principles of one case did not apply in the other.

[This article of part of the Voice of Russia Weekly Experts’ Panel Discussion](http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_18/Are-the-international-stances-of-Russia-and-the-US-inherently-incompatible/)

But it is pleasing to one’s to self esteem to claim high motives. For years Washington has claimed the moral high ground of “democracy” and now we see Moscow claiming to be the home of stability. These noble self-portraits look most convincing at some distance. For Moscow to claim to be the thumb that keeps the scales of world power balanced is to slip over its partial responsibility for the transformation of another Balkan squabble into a world war in 1914 and ignore most of the years between 1917 and 1990. Washington focuses its moral-quizzing glass on Russia rather than say, Saudi Arabia: an “Arab Spring” for Libya but not for Bahrain.

But above this normal level of sanctimony-cloaked interest, the US goes further with its bizarre obsession about Russia. It is bizarre because Russia is not very pertinent to Washington’s strategic and security concerns: it is not [threatening nuclear war](http://www.google.ca/#hl=en&sclient=psy-ab&q=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&oq=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&gs_l=hp.3..0l4.1554.7403.0.7721.29.11.0.18.18.0.102.924.10j1.11.0...0.0...1c.1.9.psy-ab.V8JZOu86HKg&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.) today; nor is Obama [considering using force against it](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/04/biden-aipac-speech-iran-threat); nor does he see it as the [greatest threat](http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/294054/terror-or-iran-romney-obama-clash-over-greatest-threat). Russia has surely seldom appeared in White House threat briefings for a decade and a half. If not a real opponent, then, Russia must fill some other need: a cost-free shadow opponent; a contrast that can be painted as dark as you like; an object of feel-good moral righteousness; a sullen teenager who must be brought to obedience.

Americans seem to need a rival, an opponent, a type of geopolitical chiaroscuro: the light can shine only against the darkness. Russia is large and significant and provides a contrast more substantial than, say, Venezuela.

Because US-Russia trade is pretty inconsequential, Russia is a low-cost object of periodic American fits of moral censure. An issue as trivial as Pussy Riot can be played up as a momentous violation whereas any sustained condemnation of the treatment of Shiites or Pakistani and Filipino servants in Saudi Arabia would come at a cost. Outrage against Russian “occupation” of parts of Georgia is cheap; outrage about Chinese occupation of Tibet is not. Russia’s sins are a perfect fit: giving a pleasing moral superiority without expensive consequences.

Or is Russia an ungrateful child? In the 1990s there was much talk about US aid and advice reforming Russia and some saw it as on the verge of becoming “just like us”. But it didn’t and such back-sliding cannot be forgiven.

And, of course, when you are looking down from a moral prominence, disagreement is sin. Moscow cannot just be disagreeing about the Syrian nightmare; it must be blocking “[the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57467452/clinton-friends-of-syria-must-unite-to-stop-russia-china-blockading-progress/).”

So, the differences do seem incompatible so long as the curious American obsession endures.

As for global realities, how are the last two “humanitarian interventions” working out? The Guardian quotes [reports identifying Hashim Thaçi, put into power by NATO, “as one of the ‘biggest fish’ in organised crime” in Kosovo](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/24/hashim-thaci-kosovo-organised-crime) and the less said about the “success” in Libya, the better. In these two cases, therefore, it doesn’t seem to be Moscow that is out of touch with global realities.

**No transition war-economic interdependence and empirics**

**Gartzke 9** \*Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of political science at UC San Diego [Gartzke Power Shuffle: Will the Coming Transition Be Peaceful? [Gartzke, Erik](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlink:lateralsearch/sng/author/Gartzke,+Erik/$N?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks). [Current History](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlinkbypubid:lateralsearch/sng/pubtitle/Current+History/$N/41559?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks)[108. 721](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.issuebrowselink:searchpublicationissue/41559/Current+History/02009Y11Y01$23Nov+2009$3b++Vol.+108+$28721$29/108/721?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks) (Nov 2009): 374-380]

THE BRITISH PRECEDENT There is precedent for a successful policy of engagement in hegemonic transition. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Great Britain found it could work with the nouveau riche United States. Unlike in preceding transitions, protagonists did not become antagonists because they had so much in common. The United States, late to the European-led game of imperial enterprise, quickly discovered that conquest did not pay. America, after fiascos in Cuba and the Philippines, was happy to be a commercial, rather than imperial, power. Britain, too, found that the promotion of free commerce served its interests. As the world's largest trading power, the United Kingdom benefited disproportionately from encouraging a system of reciprocal access to national and colonial markets. Market economics rapidly made control of territory much less important than access to consumers. Promoting the prosperity of dependent powers further weakened the appeal of colonial administration. Thus the United States was able to peacefully assume the mantle of hegemon because the two powers had developed compatible international objectives through a common system of global commerce. Under British hegemony, the United States had obtained much of what it wanted from the established world order, and it enjoyed the additional benefit of not having to pay the high price of policing a system that was largely acceptable. The United States could free-ride on British efforts to manage a market-based global economy. The British, meanwhile, respected the US sphere of influence in the Americas, while the United States had no interest in controlling traditional British spheres of influence in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, as long as American manufacturers retained access to commercial markets in these regions. This system, though it included numerous colonial holdings, was not all that different from the one that the United States preferred and eventually sponsored. Indeed, the problem from an international perspective was that America was reluctant to inherit hegemony. The United States persisted as a largely demilitarized power until World War II, despite the fact that the United Kingdom's relative decline was taxing its ability to sustain the system from which the United States benefited. Only in the aftermath of World War II, when it became clear that Britain could no longer manage the global system, did the United States decide to run the world. More important than British decline, however, was the fact that the Soviet Union posed the chief alternative to American hegemony. Recognition of the increasing importance of global public goods to its own and other nations' prosperity, and cognizance of the consequences of a Soviet-led system, forced the United States to dramatically shift its foreign policy and assume the position of global leadership. It is tempting to conclude that the peaceful transition from British to US hegemony was the result of a common Anglo culture, or of unique characteristics of the United States as a nation. But Anglo amity had not prevented the American Revolution, nor had a common Anglo culture stopped the Union and the Confederacy from fighting the deadliest contest in US history. And while it is possible that American accession to hegemony was exceptional, one must hope this is not the case, given the inevitability that the United States will someday be replaced as hegemon. THE RISE OF THE REST For a time in the post-World War II period, it appeared that the Soviet Union might surpass the United States. In retrospect, those fears appear wildly misplaced, but they exemplify the power of uncertainty as a determinant of international affairs. Not knowing caused the United States to be more defensive than was perhaps necessary, while uncertainty supplied the Soviets with ammunition that made them more effective than if the truth had been fully known. World War III was avoided thanks to luck and caution, rather than averted as a product of power relations and system structure. For a time in the 1980s strategic thinkers contemplated a succession by Europe or Japan. Anglo culture, inci- dentally, cannot explain how the United States and other powers addressed debate over the prospect of these transi- tions. While there was consid- érable anxiety in the United States about commercial com- petition, there was never a serious suggestion that Japanese or European aspirations constituted a real threat to the security of the United States. Europe was at peace with itself, while the Japanese seemed more eager to copy the United States commercially than to eclipse it politically. Again, a power transition between the United States and its allies never came to pass, but it is exceedingly unlikely in any case that such a transition would have involved significant international violence. What emerged in the twentieth century, and what appears likely to persist in the twenty-first century, is the realization that commerce creates compatible interests among world powers. Other objectives remain in tension today; if substantial enough they could open up the opportunity for ambiguity, conflict, and possibly war. But a common commitment to global trade at least creates the basis for an important set of mutual or compatible interests among states. America's fear is that a successor hegemon, or a group of powers enjoying dominance over different regions, might be inimical to US interests. Such hegemons could alter or supplant the institutions and commercial, social, and political norms that have helped the United States govern a prosperous system and made America thrive as well. If hegemonic successors or competing coalitions are bound to want different things, then the United States may find that it prefers to resist the transition to a new configuration of power. If, in addition, the net effect of conflict is difficult to judge, then conflict itself will be more likely, since both sides in a dispute could expect that they might prevail in a fight. Fortunately, there is reason to believe that the interests of current and future rivals for global power may not be incompatible. As with the [Anglo-American](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7?accountid=465) transition, future power transitions may involve states that want very similar things from the international system. Changes in the global economy since the late twentieth century have made global governance more important, valuable, and relatively neutral in terms of political conflict. The developed world, the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China), and other developing countries all benefit from institutions that promote trade, finan- cial stability, and politi- cal consensus. The more that China, for example, becomes integrated into the global economic system, the more that its preferences will reflect objectives similar to those of the United States. Indeed, development has led to a world system in which most candidates for regional or global power have common or compatible interests. Whereas in the past, power reflected an inherent incompatibility with other nations, today power derives from the very interactions that make nations more similar. If there is a good prospect that the world will remain peaceful, it is because the power now needed to run the world comes from cooperation, not from military conflict.

**). Heg can’t solve war or influence outcomes-globalization and legitimacy syndrome**

**Ikenberry et al. 9 \***G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Michael Mastanduno is the associate professor of government at Dartmouth, William C. Wohlforth is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world\_politics/summary/v061/61.1.ikenberry.html, “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences, PDF, January 2009]

It has long been an axiom of social science that resources (or capabilities as defined herein) do not translate automatically into power (control over outcomes or over the behavior of other actors).28� Yet most observers regard it as similarly axiomatic that there is some positive relationship between a state’s relative capability to help or harm others and its ability to get them to do what it wants. Even if the relationship is complex, more capabilities relative to others ought to translate generally into more power and influence. By this commonsense logic, a unipole should be expected to have more influence than either of the two great powers in a bipolar system. Articles in this special issue argue that the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity may not be an unambiguous benefit for the unipole’s ability to wield influence. On the contrary, a unipolar state may face the paradoxical situation of being simultaneously more capable and more constrained. Two distinct theoretical logics suggest that a unipole might enjoy less power to shape the international system than a superpower in bipolarity. First is the logic of balancing, alliance, and opposition, discussed in the contributions by Stephen Walt and Mastanduno. The increased concentration of capabilities in the unipole may elicit increased opposition from other states—in the form of either traditional counterbalancing or subtler soft balancing. Even if such resistance falls short of offering a real counterweight, it may materially hamstring the unipole’s ability to exercise influence. As Walt argues, the structural shift to unipolarity removed one of the major motivations for the middle-ranked great powers to defer to the United States. Mastanduno offers a similar argument: the collapse of a unifying central threat signifies that in this post–cold war era the United States has less control over adjustment struggles with its principal economic partners, because it can no longer leverage their security dependence to dictate international economic outcomes. Globalization reinforces this U.S. predicament by expanding the number of relevant players in the world economy and by offering them alternatives to economic reliance on the United States. While under bipolarity the propensity of other middle powers to defer to the United States was structurally favored, under unipolarity the opposite may obtain. Even if observable balancing behavior reminiscent of bipolarity or multipolarity never occurs, a structurally induced tendency of the middle-ranked great powers to withhold cooperation may sap the unipole’s effective power. Second is a social logic of legitimacy, analyzed by Martha Finnemore. To use capabilities effectively, she argues, a unipole must seek to legitimate its role. But any system of legitimation imposes limits on the unipole’s ability to translate capabilities into power. Finnemore stresses that the legitimation strategy followed by the United States after World War II—institutionalization—imposes especially severe constraints on the use of its material capabilities in pursuit of power. The rules, norms, and institutions that constitute the current international order are thus especially resistant to the unilateral use of superior capabilities to drive outcomes. Hence, for reasons Finnemore spells out in detail, the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity may well have diminished the effective utility of the preponderant capabilities of the United States.

### China adv

**China NFU means no first strike**

**Zhenqiang 05** (Pan, Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defence University of the People’s Liberation Army of China , retired Major General of the People’s Liberation Army, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons”, China Security (World Security Institute China Program, <http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=403>]

In my view, No-First Use (NFU) has been a theoretical pillar of China’s nuclear policy. This rationale of NFU of nuclear weapons serves Beijing’s foremost security interests. It also contributes to the maintenance of world strategic stability. There are at least five reasons to explain why China has consistently stuck to that principle, and will continue to do so in the future.  
Underlying Principles  
First, NFU highlights China’s philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against a nuclear attack, pending complete nuclear disarmament. Indeed, their extremely large destructive capabilities render nuclear weapons the only truly inhumane weapon of mass destruction and are of little other use to China. Faced with U.S. nuclear blackmail in the 1950s, China had no alternative to developing its own nuclear capability so as to address the real danger of being a target of a nuclear strike. But even so, Beijing vowed that having a nuclear capability would only serve this single purpose.   
From the very beginning of acquiring a nuclear capability, Beijing announced that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any conditions; it also pledged unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon states. This claim is not merely rhetoric that cannot be verified, as some Western pundits accused. On the contrary, China’s nuclear rationale has determined the defensive nature of its nuclear force, its posture, size and operational doctrine, which have been highly visible and have stood the test of time. It is in this sense that China is NOT a nuclear weapon state in the Western sense. Unlike all the other nuclear weapon states, for example, China has never intended to use its nuclear capability to make up for the in efficiency of conventional capabilities vis-à-vis other world powers nor has China an interest in joining a nuclear arms race with other nuclear states. And thanks to the insistence of this policy based on NFU, China succeeds in reducing the nuclear element to the minimum in its relations with other nuclear nations, avoiding a possible nuclear arms race, and contributing to the global strategic stability at large. If this policy serves well its core security interests, why should Beijing change it?

**We would stop them from using weapons if they wanted to**

**Lieber and press 06** – Keir A. Leiber, author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania ("The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006)

China's nuclear arsenal is even more vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of a crisis during a Chinese alert. China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses no modern SSBNs or long-range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's, entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds to the vulnerability of the ICBMs. It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Many sources claim that China is attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs by building decoy silos. But decoys cannot provide a firm basis for deterrence. It would take close to a thousand fake silos to make a U.S. first strike on China as difficult as an attack on Russia, and no available information on China's nuclear forces suggests the existence of massive fields of decoys. And even if China built them, its commanders would always wonder whether U.S. sensors could distinguish real silos from fake ones. Despite much talk about China's military modernization, the odds that Beijing will acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent in the next decade are slim. China's modernization efforts have focused on conventional forces, and the country's progress on nuclear modernization has accordingly been slow. Since the mid-1980s, China has been trying to develop a new missile for its future ballistic missile submarine as well as mobile ICBMs (the DF-31 and longer-range DF-31A) to replace its current ICBM force. The U.S. Defense Department predicts that China may deploy DF-31s in a few years, although the forecast should be treated skeptically: U.S. intelligence has been announcing the missile's imminent deployment for decades. Even when they are eventually fielded, the DF-31s are unlikely to significantly reduce China's vulnerability. The missiles' limited range, estimated to be only 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles), greatly restricts the area in which they can be hidden, reducing the difficulty of searching for them. The DF-31s could hit the contiguous United States only if they were deployed in China's far northeastern corner, principally in Heilongjiang Province, near the Russian-North Korean border. But Heilongjiang is mountainous, and so the missiles might be deployable only along a few hundred kilometers of good road or in a small plain in the center of the province. Such restrictions increase the missiles' vulnerability and raise questions about whether they are even intended to target the U.S. homeland or whether they will be aimed at targets in Russia and Asia. Given the history of China's slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or more.

**No escalation in the middle east**

**A) Arab states won’t escalate**

**COOK et al 2007** (Steven A., fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ray Takeyh (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 2007 “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

**B) No economic damage and no great power intervention**

**KELLEY 2002** (Jack, national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo Pittsburgh Post Gazette, April 7)

During the Cold War, there was reason to suppose an Arab-Israeli war could spark a third world war. In those days, Israel was a client of the United States. The radical Arab states were clients of the Soviet Union. If the proxies got into a tiff, the conflict could spread to the principals. The closest we came to this was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Egyptians, in a surprise attack, dealt a severe blow to Israeli defense forces. Only an airlift of M-60 tanks from U.S. bases in Germany kept Israel from being overrun. Once its initial battle losses had been replaced, Israel quickly regained the initiative, routing Egyptian and Syrian forces. Israeli troops were poised to take Cairo and Damascus. The Soviets were willing to permit the United States to restore the status quo ante. But they threatened to intervene to prevent a decisive Israeli victory. So we prevailed upon the Israelis to stop short of humiliating their enemies. The Yom Kippur War was a near thing for the world. Only three times in history have U.S. forces gone to DEFCON 1, the highest war footing. The Yom Kippur War was one of those times. Now the Cold War is over. Russia is a shadow of what we thought the Soviet Union was, and is more or less an ally in the war on terror. Radical Arabs have lost their sponsor. And Egypt has, after a fashion, switched sides. There is no longer good reason to suppose a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would spread. Another consequence of the Yom Kippur war was the Arab oil embargo. But the oil "weapon" has lost much of its bang. We are more dependent upon foreign oil now than we were then, but less dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, since new sources elsewhere have been developed. And Arab governments have become so dependent upon oil revenues that the loss of them would harm Arabs more than the loss of their oil would harm us.

## 1NR

### Overview

#### The disad outweighs and turns the case – cyberattack destroys command and control and makes accidental launch—rational actors with control over their nuclear arsenals would never choose war which means we control escalation—probability is the only way to make rational calculations about risk which means you should prefer it

### Coming now

#### Cyber-attack is coming ---actors are probing weaknesses

Reed 12 John, Reports on the frontiers of cyber war and the latest in military technology for Killer Apps at Foreign Policy, "U.S. energy companies victims of potentially destructive cyber intrusions", 10/11, killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/11/us\_energy\_companies\_victims\_of\_potentially\_destructive\_cyber\_attacks

Foreign actors are probing the networks of key American companies in an attempt to gain control of industrial facilities and transportation systems, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta revealed tonight.¶ "We know that foreign **cyber actors are probing America's critical infrastructure networks**," said Panetta, disclosing previously classified information during a speech in New York laying out the Pentagon's role in protecting the U.S. from cyber attacks. "They are targeting the computer control systems that operate chemical, **electricity** and water plants, and those that guide transportation thorough the country."¶ He went on to say that the U.S. government knows of "specific instances where intruders have gained access" to these systems -- frequently known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (or SCADA) systems -- and that "they are seeking to create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic, destruction and even the loss of life," according to an advance copy of his prepared remarks.¶ The secretary said that **a coordinated attack on enough critical infrastructure could be a "cyber Pearl Harbor" that would "cause physical destruction and loss of life, paralyze and shock the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability.**"¶ While there have been reports of criminals using 'spear phishing' email attacks aimed at stealing information about American utilties, Panetta's remarks seemed to suggest more sophisticated, nation-state backed attempts to actually gain control of and damage power-generating equipment. ¶ Panetta's comments regarding the penetration of American utilities echo those of a private sector cyber security expert Killer Apps spoke with last week **who said that the networks of American electric companies were penetrated, perhaps in preparation for a Stuxnet-style attack**.¶ Stuxnet is the famous cyber weapon that infected Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges in 2009 and 2010. Stuxnet is believed to have caused some of the machines to spin erratically, thereby destroying them.¶ "**There is hard evidence** that there has been penetration of our power companies, and given Stuxnet, that is a staging step before destruction" of electricity-generating equipment, the expert told Killer Apps. Because uranium centrifuges and power turbines are both spinning machines, "**the attack is identical -- the one to take out the centrifuges and the one to take out our power systems is the same attack**."¶ "If a centrifuge running at the wrong speed can blow apart" so can a power generator, said the expert. "If you do, in fact, spin them at the wrong speeds, you can blow up any rotating device."¶ Cyber security expert Eugene Kaspersky said two weeks ago that one of his greatest fears is someone reverse-engineering a sophisticated cyber weapon like Stuxnet **-- a relatively easy task** -- and he noted that Stuxnet itself passed through power plants on its way to Iran. "Stuxnet infected thousands of computer systems all around the globe, I know there were power plants infected by Stuxnet very far away from Iran," Kaspersky said.

#### Turns china—cyberattacks cause retilation against china especially when they have been pretty consistently cyberattacking us

#### They’ll attack the grid

RT 13 – RT, January 11th, 2013, "United States ill-prepared for skyrocketing cyberattacks against critical infrastructure " rt.com/usa/cert-dhs-cyber-monitor-814/

Compared to recent years, **the cyberassaults waged during 2012 demonstrate an** alarming trend. While ICS-CERT identified 198 incidents last year, in 2009 that number was only nine.¶ "I believe that **people will not truly get this until they see the physical implications of a cyberattack**," former FBI cybercrime official Shawn Henry said last year, as quoted by CNN. "We knew about Osama bin Laden in the early '90s. After 9/11, it was a worldwide name. I believe that type of thing can and will happen in the cyber environment."¶ Leading figures in Washington have warned just as much, **equating an eventual assault on the United States’** cyber-grid **as being on par with national tragedies of historic proportions.** In October, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the country was at risk of facing a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” In December, former National Security Agency Director Mike McConnel said a “Cyber 9/11” should be imminent.¶ "We have had our 9/11 warning. Are we going to wait for the cyber equivalent of the collapse of the World Trade Centers?" McConnell told Financial Times in an interview published last month.¶ **"All of a sudden, the power doesn't work, there's no way you can get money, you can't get out of town, you can't get online, and banking, as** a function to make the world work, starts to not be reliable**,"** McConnell said. "Now, that is a cyber-Pearl Harbor, and it is achievable."

### 2NC Will Pass

#### Immigration will pass—House republicans are signing onto the House Democrat’s bill which proves that momentum is toward passage—their evidence just cites obstacles—prefer evidence that assumes broader momentum and the ability of the House to overcome those obstacles—that’s 1NC Sargent

#### Will pass – GOP

FN 10-30 [Fox News. “Pressure on House to vote on immigration renews focus on enforcement, 'sanctuary' laws” *Fox News*, 10/30/13 <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/30/pressure-on-house-to-vote-on-immigration-renews-focus-on-enforcement-sanctuary/> //GBS-JV]

House Speaker John Boehner has expressed interest in allowing votes on several incremental immigration bills, which would likely include one on tighter border security.¶ However, those concerned about the enforcement of immigration laws also fear House leaders will take their legislation to a conference committee with Senate Democrats and leave with a comprehensive bill that is tantamount to amnesty for many of this country’s 11 million illegal immigrants.¶ “If the leadership appoints conferees and we go to conference committee with the Senate over the Schumer-Rubio amnesty bill, the odds are pretty good they're going to come out with something that is basically the same as Schumer's bill,” Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, said recently.¶ That situation might put enough pressure on Boehner to put that bill to a full floor vote, which would likely pass with support from House Democrats and moderate Republicans, critics argue.

#### It’ll pass but political incentives make it close and mean PC is key

Sullivan 10-28 [Sean. Politics for Washington Post. “Why Obama is racing the clock on immigration” *The Washington Post*, 10/28/13 ln//GBS-JV]

President Barack Obama used a very urgent tone Thursday in remarks designed to press House Republicans to pass immigration reform, calling on them at least twice to try to get it done “this year.”¶ ¶ “Let’s not wait,” the president said. “It doesn’t get easier to just put it off. Let’s do it now.”¶ Politically speaking, the president is right. The longer the immigration debate drags on, the lower the odds it will culminate in a bill on his desk.¶ ¶ Here’s why.¶ ¶ Every day that goes by is a day closer to the 2014 midterm elections. And the months leading up to Election Day are a time for lawmakers to campaign, raise money, and do everything they can to hold on to their jobs. It’s not a time for a contentious legislative debate that could complicate the fall campaign.¶ ¶ That’s why history has shown that little gets done legislatively right before the election. Members are in their districts and states more and more often and less and less willing to take risks in Congress.¶ ¶ And immigration reform is a risky proposition for many House Republicans. Despite national polls showing the public largely in favor of overhauling the nation’s laws, the calculus is often different back home. This is in large part why months after the Senate passed a sweeping bipartisan immigration bill, the House has yet to act.¶ ¶ **But that doesn’t mean it won’t.** Republicans have already moved ahead on some piecemeal measures. And House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said Wednesday that he was “hopeful” something could get done by the end of the year.¶ ¶ Coming off a fiscal battle that badly damaged the Republican brand, there is, arguably, more political incentive for Boehner to act on immigration than there has been in the past. Republicans need to repair their image.¶ ¶ But there isn’t much time left on the legislative calendar this year, and it’s not clear whether Boehner will bring immigration to a vote before the year is up. But this much we do know: Every day that goes by makes it increasingly difficult to pass new immigration laws.

#### Rubio is an aff warrant—proves passage is likely

Kim 10/28 – Seung Min Kim is an assistant editor who covers Congress for POLITICO. Previously, she edited the Arena and served as a Web producer. (“Marco Rubio sparks immigration debate”, 10/28/2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/marco-rubio-sparks-immigration-debate-98992.html)

Marco Rubio’s latest comments supporting scaled-back immigration reform may not be the death knell for the effort that they seem. Immigration reformers argue that the remarks don’t actually change the political calculus in the GOP-led House, which was never going to pass the Senate’s comprehensive bill anyway. Reform foes say Rubio lost any credibility he had with House conservatives by authoring the Gang of Eight bill in the first place. The Florida senator has long called for giving House Republicans some space to come up with their own plan. And some advocates believe Rubio’s call to focus on piecemeal aspects of reform could actually pave the way for some kind of agreement between the House and Senate. “This is making a more doable ask for House Republicans. House Republicans are trying to pass pieces that add up to a package,” said Tamar Jacoby, the president and CEO of ImmigrationWorks USA, a pro-reform business group. “‘We’ll meet you halfway’ is essentially what the message is.” She added of Rubio’s remarks: “That’s just realism.” But Rubio became the target of criticism on Monday from some outside reform advocates and opponents as they alternatively groused that he is either ditching the Senate Gang of Eight bill he once so fiercely supported or still trying to repair his image with conservative voters who don’t want to legalize the millions of undocumented immigrants in the country to begin with. Rubio’s comments come amid a small and very narrow window for action on immigration reform before the end of the year. House Republican leaders have no current plans to vote on any type of reform legislation — but that could change if momentum grows for action in the House. Since the Senate bill’s passage in June, Rubio has stayed away from efforts to publicly pressure House Republicans on immigration reform. He has repeatedly opted not to meet with the other seven Gang senators to devise a strategy on how to move reform through the House, and his comments are the next chapter in Rubio’s hands-off effort in the House. Randy Johnson, a senior vice president at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said during a conference call Monday that he believed at least one or two immigration bills, “if not more,” will come to the House floor in the weeks ahead. He added that he viewed Rubio’s comments as a way to allow House Republicans to find their own way on immigration reform. “It certainly wasn’t saying, ‘Let’s pull the plug on what’s going on in the House’ or that the House should pull the plug,” said Johnson, who oversees the Chamber’s immigration reform efforts.

### Link

#### Oil has an army of lobbyists and a mountain of cash

**Froomkin ’11** [4/6/11, Dan Froomkin is contributing editor of Nieman Reports, and the former senior Washington correspondent for the Huffington Post, “How The Oil Lobby Greases Washington's Wheels”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases_n_845720.html>]

**ENERGY GIANTS ANTE UP With so much public opposition, why do subsidies remain? You might as well ask** why there is no carbon tax, or **why there was no significant reform legislation passed after the BP oil spill. The answer is that one of the many things the industry can do with its fat pocketbook is hire a veritable army of sharp lobbyists and back them up with big wads of cash** in the form of campaign donations and spending. **The end result is that the industry has a remarkable ability to get its way on Capitol Hill**. According to the Center for Responsive Politics' website, **the oil and gas industry has spent more than $1 billion on lobbying since 1998, including a jaw-dropping** [**$147 million just last year**](http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=E01&year=a). For comparison's sake, $**147 million is about equivalent to the total budget of 100 congressional offices**. That's more than the $103 million spent in 2010 by the financial service industry, another potent lobbying force -- but considerably less than the $240 million spent by the pharmaceutical industry**. Among major industries, Opensecrets.org** [**ranked Big Oil fifth**](http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2010&indexType=i) **in terms of lobbying dollars spent,** behind only Big Pharma, electric utilities, business associations and insurance. **The oil and gas industry used its $147 million to employ 788 individual lobbyists in 2010 -- some 500 (or almost two thirds) of whom, according to Opensecrets.org, are former federal employees who came through the revolving door particularly well versed in the ways of government. All told, that's well more than one oil and gas lobbyist per member of Congress out there on the Hill** arming allies with talking points and briefing books, spinning the undecided and **pressuring the opposition. And there's more of them every year. Consider the** [**trendlines**](http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=E01&year=2010)**. As recently as 2004, the oil and gas industry spent about $52 million a year in lobbying; by 2009, that figure was up to $175 million** **-- or a 300 percent increase** in just five years. The **industry backs up its extraordinary lobbying effort with lavish spending on political campaigns. Candidates associated with oil and gas companies made about $15 million in direct campaign donations** during the 2010 mid-term election cycle ($26 million during the 2008 presidential cycle). **The industry was also responsible for** [**more than $10 million in donations**](http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.php?txt=E01&cycle=2010) **through its** [**political action committees**](http://www.opensecrets.org/glossary.php?id=46), or PACs, in the 2010 cycle. The [trendlines](http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2010&ind=E01) are notable here, as well. In the early ’90s, oil and gas campaign spending favored Republicans over Democrats by about a 2 to 1 margin: **For every $1 the industry gave to Democrats, it gave Republicans $1.78. But starting in the 1996 election cycle** (think Al Gore), **that changed dramatically. Now, for every $1 the industry gives Democrats, it gives Republicans about $3.35.** Among the top oil and gas industry donors in the 2010 cycle, [Koch Industries](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/koch-industries-web-of-influence_n_845306.html) and ExxonMobil head the list. And Opensecrets.org's top 20 list of [oil and gas money recipients](http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?cycle=2010&ind=E01) is 4 to 1 Republican. In addition to contributions to individuals and PACs, there's the whole new world of spending opportunities opened up by recent Supreme Court rulings that essentially blew a hole through the post-Watergate campaign finance laws. [**Super PACs**](http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2010) **are groups that can now accept unlimited contributions, though they must disclose their contributor**s**. Opensecrets.org** [**calculates**](http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/03/influx-of-corporate-political-cash.html) **that companies with interests in the energy sector combined to give more than $5.6 million to Super PACs in the 2010 cyc**le. Former Bush political guru Karl Rove's American Crossroads group, for one such Super PAC. It[spent $21 million](http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=American+Crossroads&cycle=2010) on political advertising in the 2010 cycle; oil and gas interests [contributed just over $3 million](http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/indus.php?cmte=American+Crossroads&cycle=2010) of that amount. **The recent court rulings also opened the way for nonprofit groups to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns -- and unlike the Super PACs, they don't have to disclose their donors**. All they have to do is report how much they spent. [These groups](http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=U), led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, reported $140 million in campaign spending in the 2010 cycle, the vast majority of which went to support conservative causes. **There's no way to know how much of that money came from Big Oil. Adding yet more firepower to its lobbyists’ arsenal, API** [**announced last month**](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/24/american-petroleum-instit_n_827819.html) **that it will start funding political campaigns directly through a new PAC of its own -**- in addition to what its member organizations give already. "**API is very focused on making sure that we have a voice in policy debates,**" said its spokesman, Durbin. "We're always looking at ways to improve the way we do our jobs here. This just adds one more tool to leverage our ability to get the point across about the critical nature of this industry."

#### The plan sparks backlash over the process of ratification, and requires Presidential involvement

Phil Taylor 13, E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/

It is unclear who in the Senate objected to the agreement’s passage, but sources say it was likely out of concern for the process by which it was being passed rather than the substance of the agreement. ¶ That may stem in part from lingering uncertainty over whether the agreement is a treaty, which would require a two-thirds majority for Senate ratification, or an executive agreement, which would require implementing legislation to be passed by a majority in both chambers. ¶ Regardless, its failure was a surprise to staff on the ENR Committee who had crafted a news release in preparation for its passage but had to delete it after the agreement was blocked. ¶ According to the report by Foreign Relations Republicans, the Obama administration has yet to say whether the agreement is a treaty or an executive agreement but appears to prefer the latter. Mexico’s Senate ratified the agreement, suggesting it was interpreted as a treaty. ¶ If it is a treaty, a formal communication would need to be sent from the president to the Foreign Relations Committee, which would trigger hearings on the matter and allow Congress to interpret any ambiguous language in the agreement. ¶ That is important, because several provisions in the treaty “invite scrutiny and clarification,” according to the committee report. ¶ “The treaty doesn’t have every detail worked out,” said Neil Brown, a former adviser to Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) who was ranking member of the committee until his retirement earlier this month. ¶ For example, one section of the agreement calls for “common standards,” but it is unclear whether that requires companies to adopt U.S. safety and environmental standards or Mexico’s, which are considered less developed. Another area of the agreement creates a dispute resolution process without saying whether the arbitration is binding, the report said. ¶ The agreement would allow joint inspections by Interior’s BSEE and the Mexican government to ensure compliance with applicable laws. ¶ Some on the Foreign Relations Committee said they were miffed that the administration did not consult with them before pushing the agreement through in the lame duck.